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FOREWORD: DOES EVIDENCE LAW MATTER?
David P. Leonard*
Victor J. Gold**
The essay form is the fit instrument for a thinker whose chief
concern is to lay bare the contending claims that seek the mediation and authority of society through law, and to give some
indication, at least, of how these processes of mediation in fact
operate. For the essay is tentative, reflective, suggestive, contradictory and incomplete. It mirrors the perversities and complexities of life.1
Whether evidence law "matters" is a subject capable of as many
interpretations as there are evidence scholars. There is, in other words,
no single way to approach this question. Because the authors of the essays that follow devote much of their professional lives to the study of
evidence law, it may be assumed that they believe the subject "matters" a
great deal. Yet we suspect that all who deal with evidence law sometimes
ask themselves whether it ever serves the law's overriding values. Our
thoughts on these subjects are often tentative and speculative; to reach
their full flower, they could benefit from exposure and critical commentary. The essay format provides the ideal vehicle for exposing such
thoughts.
We asked a group of distinguished scholars from around the country
to respond to the general question, "Does eyidence law matter?" purposely providing little specific guidance. What we received is a series of
essays each of which approaches the question from a different perspective. While it is possible to categorize the essays in many different ways,
they may be grouped according to four general themes.
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., 1974, University of California, San Diego; J.D., 1977, University of California, Los Angeles.
** Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., 1972; J.D., 1975, University
of California, Los Angeles.
1. FELIX FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT: EXTRA-JuDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 203 (Phillip H. Kurland ed. 1970),

reprintedin Felix Frankfurter, Book Review 77 U. PA. L. REv. 436, 437 (1929) (reviewing
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928)).
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THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN EVIDENCE RULES, SOCIAL VALUES
AND POLITICAL REALITIES

The first group of essays explores the goals and limitations of the
trial process and the adversary system. Professor Stephan Landsman
takes an historical approach to the general question in Who Needs Evidence Rules, Anyway?. Using proceedings such as the trial of Sacco and
Vanzetti and the confirmation hearings on the nomination of Clarence
Thomas as illustrations, Professor Landsman answers the question
"Does evidence law matter?" with a strong "yes." He concludes that
evidence law is essential to the administration of justice in an adversarial
system. In Does It Matter Who Is in Charge of Evidence Law?, Professor
Eleanor Swift describes how California voters used the initiative process
to make fundamental changes in rules relating to character evidence and
hearsay. She analyzes the values served by the traditional rules and argues that the processes of adjudication and legislation are better suited to
reforming evidence law than is the initiative process.
Three essays in this group specifically address the effect of evidence
on the fact finder. In Making the Law of FactualDeterminationsMatter
More, Professor Randolph Jonakait argues that accurate fact determination is crucial to the enforcement of the substantive law and suggests that
in order to improve both the quantity and quality of information received
by the fact finder, scholars should pay greater attention to the entire field
of fact determination and to studies of the non-evidentiary forces that
affect jurors' information processing. Only by looking beyond the evidence rules themselves, he argues, can we improve the accuracy of fact
determination. Professor Paul Bergman points out that it isn't just what
juries hear but also what they do not hear that can affect their verdicts.
In Admonishing Jurorsto DisregardWhat They Haven'tHeard, Professor
Bergman points out that the difficulties judges face in controlling jurors'
inferential processes are magnified when, because of human nature and
their unfamiliarity with evidence rules, jurors draw inferences from the
failure of a party to offer certain evidence. Professor Bergman explores
what, if anything, a judge should tell the jury when a party's failure to
offer evidence stems from evidence rules prohibiting that evidence. And
in his essay "The Whole Truth?" How Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers
Deceitful, Professor Bruce Green observes that evidence law sometimes
promotes the appearance of deceit because it eliminates from consideration evidence jurors anticipate receiving. He also notes that evidence law
sometimes promotes actual deceit by legitimizing prevailing methods of
witness preparation. He suggests that educating jurors about the purposes of evidence law and the realities of the adversary process can go a
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long way toward eliminating the appearance of deceit and controlling its
effects.
Two essays draw examples from the popular culture to make points
about the rules of evidence. In Rape, Lies and Videotape, Professor Robert Garcia uses a scene from Last Tango in Paris to examine both the
meaning of rape and the multi-faceted difficulties of "proving" at trial
whether rape occurred. He describes the problematic nature of definitions and of our construction of reality, and shows how minor differences
in these factors, or in the way particular witnesses, jurors or lawyers perceive them, can affect the outcome of a trial. In Thelma and Louise and
the Law: Do the Rape Shield Rules Matter?, Professor Ann Althouse
asks whether rape shield laws have decreased the abuses of a system that
further victimizes the rape victim, or whether they are merely a part of
an entire system that pervasively oppresses women. In the film Thelma
and Louise, a woman shoots her companion's rapist and expresses the
belief that calling the police would be useless because they would never
believe her companion's claim of rape. Professor Althouse explores why
the character feels a need to take the law into her own hands and then to
flee, but she expresses some optimism that the rape shield laws will eventually have some positive effects on the system.
The final three essays in this group also draw connections between
evidence rules and social values. In What's the Matter With Evidence?,
Professor Kenneth Graham, Jr. decries the unwillingness of evidence
teachers to teach the rules of evidence, the general disdain for such rules
among legal academics, and the tendency of evidence scholars to write
about abstract concepts rather than to read the cases and to attend to the
realities of the courtroom. He challenges us to examine more carefully
why we maintain certain rules and to focus our reform efforts on the
rules themselves. Professor Mark Cammack's essay Evidence Rules and
the Ritual Functions of Trials: "Saying Something of Something," suggests that we consider the trial as a ritual that symbolically expresses and
validates abstract ideas about social reality. He also shows how the evidence rules themselves reflect the "radical dissociation" of law and fact
in our society. Finally in Rules of Evidence and Substantive Policy, Professor David Leonard asks whether rules of evidence are subservient to
substantive legal rules, or whether by design or application they establish, limit or further substantive rights. Using several evidence rules as
examples, he concludes that many rules do have substantive impact and
suggests that such impact should be considered as we attempt to reform
the law of evidence.
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HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO THE

CONCEPTUALIZATION AND REFORM OF EVIDENCE LAW

Other essays offer more general thoughts about how our evidence
system is constructed and how the system might be explored in the literature. In Meta-Evidence: Do We Need It?, Professor Christopher Mueller
points out that evidence rules, like procedural rules, are often called upon
to work in cases quite different from those their drafters envisioned. Professor Mueller offers some thoughts about the extent to which evidentiary reform and science-particularly statistics-can assist the courts in
toxic tort trials and child abuse prosecutions.
The next several essays look to history. In Scholarly and Institutional Challenges to the Law of Evidence: From Bentham to the ADR
Movement, Professor Laird Kirkpatrick notes that the writings of the
great evidence scholars of the last two centuries, especially those of Jeremy Bentham, repudiated much established doctrine. He points out that
while scholars long have called for reform and, in many cases, the elimination of exclusionary rules, modem practice realities finally have moved
in that direction. In particular, he notes that the Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) movement rejects traditional evidence law. However,
Professor Kirkpatrick demonstrates that basic principles underlying evidence law continue to have force even in the ADR context where they
tend to affect the weight, if not the admissibility, of evidence. Professor
Michael Ariens also draws from history. In The Law of Evidence and the
Idea of Progress, Professor Ariens reviews the various schools of thought
that have dominated modem evidence law. He criticizes the notion that
evidence scholarship should focus on the progressive ideal of law reform
and suggests that we conceptualize evidence law in a new way.
Two other essays draw on the intellectual history of evidence scholarship to point out opportunity for clarification and reform of evidence
law. In The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, Professor Ronald Allen
builds upon an earlier work by Professor Vaughn Ball. That work challenged the validity of the traditional concept of conditional relevancy.
Professor Allen extends this work, and suggests an amendment to the
Federal Rules of Evidence that would embody a simpler, more coherent
formula. Professor Richard Friedman looks at evidence treatises in Evidentiary Rules and Rulings: The Role of Treatises. He notes that evidence codifications and common law rules are frequently general,
providing no clear answers to many issues. As a result, the impact of this
law is reduced. He argues that an evidence law treatise can narrow if not
fill the gap between the general statement of law and its specific
applications.
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How COURTS TREAT THE EVIDENCE RULES

Several essays discuss the ways the courts tend to treat particular
evidence rules. Professor Margaret Berger takes a broad view of the issue in When, if Ever, Does EvidentiaryError ConstituteReversible Error?.
She examines the reported federal appellate cases from 1990 to determine
how often courts reversed for evidentiary error and finds that while the
courts found error in many cases, they rarely found the error to be reversible and usually gave short shrift to evidentiary questions. Professor
Berger suggests that appellate courts might be sending a signal that evidence rules do not much matter, and she expresses concern for that possibility. Professor Victor Gold also takes a broad view in Do the Federal
Rules of Evidence Matter?. The Federal Rules of Evidence were intended to reform and simplify federal evidence rules. Professor Gold focuses primary attention on rules governing witness competency and
impeachment, and examines whether they have achieved their goals. He
shows that courts have often twisted or ignored the Federal Rules, continued to apply old law, created new law, and found discretion to admit
evidence where the rules were intended to limit that discretion. He then
discusses some sources of these problems and suggests ways to resolve
them.
Two other essays look at specific evidentiary rules, both relating to
hearsay. In The Effect of the Catchalls on CriminalDefendants: Little
Red Riding Hood Meets the Hearsay Wolf and Is Devoured, Professor
Myrna Raeder criticizes the use of the so-called "catchall" exceptions in
the Federal Rules of Evidence. She observes that these exceptions have
created a discretionary aspect to hearsay law which undermines certainty
and increases arbitrariness. She offers alternative formulations of the
catchall exceptions to resolve these problems. Judge Arthur Alarcon's
essay Suspect Evidence: Admissibility of Co-ConspiratorStatements and
UncorroboratedAccomplice Testimony, examines whether the statement
of an alleged co-conspirator or accomplice, standing alone, can be sufficient evidence to convict an accused. Judge Alarcon concludes that because of the dangers posed by such evidence, trial judges should use their
powers under the evidence rules to exclude the testimony of alleged
crime partners when its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial
effect. Judge Alarcon argues that trial courts have the responsibility to
exercise their powers in this way in order to accomplish the truth-seeking
function of the trial.
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THE NEED FOR MORE FORMAL EVIDENTIARY RULES IN
PRETRIAL AND OTHER NON-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

The final essays explore several settings in which formal evidence
rules are not typically used, and discuss the wisdom of maintaining procedures less bound by evidence rules. In The PretrialImportance and
Adaptation of the "Trial" Evidence Rules, Professor Edward Imwinkelried suggests that evidence law matters most at the pretrial stages
of litigation, such as hearings on motions in limine and summary judgment. Accordingly, he suggests that certain aspects of evidence law
should be adapted to this reality. In Does Evidence Law Matterin Criminal Suppression Hearings?, Professor Elizabeth Marsh explores whether
rules of evidence are, and should be, applicable to pretrial suppression
hearings in criminal cases. She notes that the proper answer to the question depends on a consideration of the particular evidentiary rule involved and the purposes of suppression hearings and argues that
although the rules should play a role in the hearings, their importance is
overshadowed by the constitutional purposes of the hearings and the issues at stake. Finally, in Evolution in Child Abuse Litigation: The Theoretical Void Where Evidentiaryand Procedural Worlds Collide, Professor
William Patton suggests that where a single event or problem, such as
child abuse, gives rise to multiple cases, evidentiary rulings in one case
can have significant impact on the other related litigation. Notwithstanding this impact, he notes, current evidence doctrine provides no basis for considering the prejudicial impact of these rules upon the related
litigation.
This Symposium will leave the reader with no simple answer to the
question "Does evidence law matter?" Yet, the essays vividly show the
breadth and complexity of issues presented by modem evidence law.
What emerges from this Symposium, therefore, is a reaffirmation of a
principle so basic to legal scholarship that it is often forgotten: the pursuit of answers is worthwhile even if those answers can never be found.

